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Microeconomics, Norms, and Rationality*

Alexander James Field
University of Santa Clara
I. Introduction
A divergence of views among microeconomists in general and game
theorists in particular regarding the explanatory objectives of microeconomic theory has become apparent in recent years. This divergence
concerns, most fundamentally, the question whether institutions, legal
or customary rules, or social norms are to be classified among the
endogenous as opposed to the exogenous variables in the framework of
microeconomic analysis. 1 The majority of economists are probably
agnostic or ambivalent on this question, not having confronted, or not
having had to confront, the issue in their own work. Many have sidestepped it by treating institutions as immutable or by restricting their
analyses to a given rule regime. But rules do vary and change, and
among those who are concerned with studying variation in institutions,
two diverging views are increasingly identifiable, sometimes coexisting
even within the writings of the same author.
The first sees game theory (and microeconomic theory in general)
as an analytical device useful for considering the comparative incentive
features of (and corresponding outcomes associated with) different institutional regimes, regimes that might be changed in one's capacity as
a policymaker or that have varied in fact as the result of differential
historical development in different regions. The second position accepts this statement of the objectives of microeconomic theory vis-avis institutions for the short run but takes it as the ultimate task of
microeconomic and game theory to provide a dynamic theory of the
origin, persistence, and change of institutions, using a model that does
not make appeal to "ad hoc" exogenously specified rules or norms.
This second position greatly expands the scope of microeconomic
analysis and makes work consistent with the first position seem limited
by comparison. Whereas the first approach concerns itself only with
the consequences of institutional variation, the second addresses
causes as well. Theoretical frameworks must nevertheless be judged
© 1984 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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not only according to what they promise but also according to what
they deliver. Work consistent with the second position has not, by and
large, delivered what it has promised. 2 This paper investigates some of
the reasons why this has been true. In particular, it is argued that if one
accepts the second position in its extreme form, 3 the analytical structure of microeconomic theory begins to unravel, in the sense that one is
left with no consistent explanation of why the world does not degenerate into a war of all against all.
An implication of this paper is that the contribution microeconomic theory offers to the analysis of institutional variation lies primarily in work consistent with the first position: comparative exercises
where rules are varied and the impact on endogenous variables (such
as output and prices) is investigated, but where adherence to basic
rules in each of the cases compared is taken as given or as accounted
for by forces outside the model. 4 The more limited objective of work
consistent with this first view, that is, the absence in such work of a
general theory of the causes of institutional variation, does not necessarily render it deficient any more than the absence in economic theory
of explanations for the origin, persistence, and possible change of individual preferences should necessarily be viewed as a deficiency of such
theory. In any social scientific model, defining what is not to be explained is an essential part of delineating what is to be explained.
A common critical approach to microeconomic theory has been to
accept the proposition that the theory embodies a methodological individualist approach in an extreme form and then to criticize or reject
methodological individualism and thus, derivatively, microeconomic
theory. 5 This paper adopts a different strategy and suggests that the
problem lies not so much with the "true" structure of the theory, but
rather with the perception of its structure. 6 Markets require and presuppose certain fundamental relations of predictability in the actions of
economic agents, which can be thought of as the constitutive rules of
the market. These rules form part of the description of a market game.
Although they may change (for reasons understood imperfectly), they
cannot, or at least all of them cannot, usefully be thought of as arising
as the result of previous plays of the game in which they did not
prevail. The rules of any game-"cooperative" or "noncooperative"
(these terms have very specific meanings in game theory)-define both
what can be varied in pursuit of one's interest and what cannot. The
outcome of a "noncooperative" chess game and the particular sequence of moves leading up to it are not specified in advance; the rules
do, however, constrain the movements of various pieces. Similarly,
neither the outcome nor the entire sequence of actions in a market
game is specified in detail by its rules. Nevertheless, the assumption of
privately owned endowments does form part of the description of the
game, as do the prohibitions against theft and fraud. In any persisting
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market game, whether interpreted as a cooperative or a noncooperative game, the fundamental legal and customary rules that define it are
not subject to bargaining, in the sense that at least a large fraction of
individual agents exclude from consideration the option of failing to
abide by such rules as part of the range of possibilities open to them for
improving their welfare. In other words, these rules confront individuals as one contributor to the constraints they face, constraints also
influenced by technologies, endowments, preferences, and the decisions of others. Why agents rule out such possibilities for rule violation
is an important question, but such behavior does not necessarily follow
from the kind of instrumental means-end calculations assumed to take
place within these rules.
It is not material for the purposes of this essay whether these rules
are actually perceived as such, nor does this essay take a position on
whether these rules or structures have their origin in genetic endowments, as the sociobiologists would have it, or are viewed as culturally
or historically given, or represent a particularly human capability
voluntarily to recognize imperatives of moral obligation. But the assumption that some system of rules, norms, or structures persists is an
analytical necessity if microeconomic theory or game theory is to be
undertaken within the empirical context of stable political and social
orders. The structure of the logical argument in favor of this proposition might be called, instead of reductio ad absurdum, reductio ad
anarchia. It consists, in its barest form, of the following syllogism:
PROPOSITION 1: If one views the world as consisting of selfinterested agents unconstrained by rules or norms, or norm-like phenomena, there exists no explanation for why the world does not degenerate into a Hobbesian war of all against all.
PROPOSITION 2: One frequently observes stable social existence.
CONCLUSION: If the behavioral principle of social science models is
to be self-interest maximization, and one wishes to model stable social
orders, one must posit logically anterior rules or norms that help define
the constraints and, thus, the arena within which such maximization
takes place. 7
Not all economists accept this argument. At his most polemical,
Gary Becker clearly disagrees:
. . . economists cannot resist the temptation to hide their own lack of
understanding behind allegations of irrational behavior, unnecessary ignorance, folly, ad hoc shifts in values, and the like, which is simply
acknowledging defeat under the guise of considered judgment. . . .
Naturally, what is tempting to economists nominally committed to the
economics approach becomes irresistible to others without a commitment to the scientific study of sociology, psychology or anthropology.
With an ingenuity worthy of admiration if put to better use, almost any
conceivable behavior is alleged to be dominated by ignorance and irra-

686

Economic Development and Cultural Change
tionality, values and their frequent unexplained shifts, custom and tradition, the compliance somehow induced by social norms or the ego and
the id. 8

An example suggested by Becker of the type of explanation emanating
from those who lack "a commitment to scientific study" is the claim
that "businessmen talk about the social responsibilities of business
because their attitudes are said to be influenced by public discussions
rather than because such talk is necessary to maximize their profits
given the climate of public interventionism. " 9 To the extent that "social responsibility" encompasses adhering to corporate codes of ethics, Becker directly questions the sincerity of statements such as the
following from David Rockefeller in an issue of the Hofstra Law Review:
A moral foundation is imperative in a free society that affords each
individual the latitude for independent thought and action. Without ethical values a free society would become a jungle .... Ethical principles
are the glue that holds a business system of free enterprise together.
Business runs on mutual trust and confidence that others will live up to
their word. The marketplace, which is the heart of a human society,
could not exist without it. 10
There is no a priori reason to believe that this statement, which
accompanied a call for adherence to corporate codes of ethics, reflects,
as Becker would have it, the individual profit-maximizing strategy.
Adherence to ethical norms may be "reasonable" and socially desirable, but it does not necessarily follow from instrumental means-ends
calculations. Some businessmen and economists view statements such
as Rockefeller's (whether accompanied by adherence or not) as representing appeasement of naive or malevolent reformers, and argue that
the only good defense against such reformers is a good offense in which
the need for corporate codes of ethics is denied: that strategy indeed,
tends increasingly to dominate discussion. 11 Justifying rule violation
(e.g., bribery) on the grounds that it is an "efficient" solution (both the
briber and the bribee are made better oft), many businessmen and
professionals neglect or deny responsibility for the corrosive effect of
such behavior in the aggregate on adherence to the Rule of Law. 12 As
will become apparent, it is difficult to counter such conclusions with
arguments that stress only the self-interest of the individuals involved.
Nevertheless, Becker seems to deny on a priori grounds the possibility
that Rockefeller might mean what he says-that there can be such a
thing, as Charles Fried puts it, as a "moral cause." 13
In addition to questioning the sincerity of businessmen who might
publicly support corporate codes of ethics, Becker comes close to
attacking the scholarly integrity of those who, for example, might at-

Alexander James Field

687

tribute compliance to rules as in part the result of adherence to social
norms. But in a more restrained passage of the work quoted above
Becker identifies the economic approach with three key assumptions:
(a) the assumption of maximizing behavior, (b) the assumption that
markets exist, and (c) the assumption that individuals have stable preferences over the psycho-physiological states induced by consumption
of goods and services, preferences which do not differ substantially
across social class or region. 14 The second assumption is the most
interesting from the standpoint of this paper. If by assuming that "markets exist" Becker takes as given adherence to the fundamental legal
or customary framework within which exchanges take place, then very
little separates his position from that advanced here. But what ensures
compliance with these rules in his model? 15 As the quoted passage
indicates, he is disdainful of any explanation that relies on adherence to
norms. Since much of Becker's work appears to involve the application of strictly individualistic cost-benefit calculations to behavior one
might otherwise believe to be constrained, at least in part, by rules or
norms, there is an obvious tension in Becker's analysis between positions 1 and 2. This tension is observable, as will become apparent, also
in the writings of Walras and of some game theorists today.
John Harsanyi, for example, in criticizing the work of Talcott
Parsons, argues that "social norms should not be used as basic explanatory variables in analyzing social behavior, but rather should be themselves explained in terms of peoples' individual objectives and interests. " 16 A number of game theorists, rising to this challenge and
recognizing what is taken for granted in the assumption of a "cooperative" game, now see the task of game theory to be the demonstration of
how "cooperative" games are the outcomes of, or are embedded in,
"noncooperative" games. Two objections can be raised against this
line of attack, insofar as it is designed to produce a theory of social
organization that avoids reference to culturally or genetically determined norms. First, even "noncooperative" games contain, as part of
their description, certain rules adherence to which is assumed as part
of the analysis. Although additional cooperation is precluded by the
assumption that the game is "noncooperative," the very fact that interaction can be described and perceived as a game is evidence of a
rudimentary structure of interaction. Chess is not described by game
theorists as a cooperative game; certain moves are, nevertheless, considered to be "illegal." Pocketing one's opponent's rook when it
threatens one's queen may dramatically improve one's chances of winning, but is ruled out of discussion in considerations of chess strategy.
Second, a common theoretical device in the attempt to derive
"cooperative outcomes" from "noncooperative" games has been to
assume that the noncooperative game is repeated. 17 Is it not just as ad
hoc to assume, without explanation, that a game is repeated, as it is to
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assume that binding (enforceable) contracts can be entered into while it
is being played (one of the key distinguishing features of "cooperative" games)? Yet some game theorists appear to deny this.
If Becker, Harsanyi, and others with similar views are correct, the
work of microeconomic theorists for the next couple of decades is cut
out. The task must be to show how phenomena previously explained as
the result of nonrational behavior or the operation of such ad hoc
devices as social norms in fact result from the rational interaction of
freely choosing self-interested individuals unconstrained by such
norms. If the constraining influence of rules or laws, at least in the
short run, is to be granted (and it is hard not to do this) then the choice
of these rules or laws as opposed to others is what must be explained as
the result of interacting, freely choosing individuals. A great deal of
recent work in microeconomic theory has been motivated by such
methodological objectives, and this research program is increasingly
attractive to a minority in such noneconomic disciplines as political
science, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. 18
This paper argues that not only preferences, technologies, and
endowments, but also certain additional exogenous variables, need to
be taken as given within the framework of microeconomic analysis.
Among these are language and the human predisposition (whether genetically, culturally, or individualistically explained) to adhere to law
or custom when others do so, even when there are individual incentives to do otherwise. In a limited number of cases involving regulative
rules, game theory suggests how the existence of shared language and
the possibility of communication could explain why some rather than
others of a set of possible norms or rules have emerged. But interagent
communication is only part of what distinguishes political order from
political chaos and only part of what, in game-theory terms, distinguishes a "cooperative" from a "noncooperative" game. The ability
to make binding contracts in a cooperative game is at least equally
important in distinguishing it from a noncooperative one. The capability and willingness to make such contracts presuppose agreement on a
more fundamental set of rules, and the assumption of interagent communication alone cannot account for why or how the norms or rules
making possible such agreements emerge or are selected.
II. Microeconomics, Game Theory, and Norms

Microeconomic theory has traditionally been subdivided into a theory
of nonstrategic interaction, the theory of general competitive equilibrium in a market economy first developed in its modern form by Leon
Walras, and a theory of strategic interaction, 19 a subset of the theory of
games developed initially by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.20 In the Walrasian model, no one agent believes that varying the
quantity of any output or input individually demanded or supplied will

Alexander James Field

689

affect prices or quantities for the system as a whole. Walras captured
this aspect of a market economy by assuming that agents placed their
orders after hearing an announced price vector that they could not
alter, although no actual trades were to take place until an equilibrium
vector was found. Total excess demands and supplies for the economy
guided the auctioneer through a sequence of announced price vectors
and orders as the system "groped" toward an equilibrium price vector,
at which these excess demands and supplies were eliminated. Through
the metaphor of the auctioneer and tatonnement, Walras was able both
to have prices confront the individual as external and beyond influence
and in the aggregate to have them reflect the joint desires and capabilities of the collectivity. The theory of strategic interaction, by contrast,
has been concerned with the examination of behavior and outcomes in
situations (such as an oligopolistic noncompetitive market) where one
agent's actions may directly depend on and in turn influence the actions and payoffs of other agents.
In recent years the competitive/game-theoretic, nonstrategic/
strategic-interaction dichotomies have become less distinct as an entirely different (non-Walrasian) approach to competitive equilibrium
has developed. This approach stems from the work of Francis
Edgeworth and embodies the assumption that final allocations are
reached as the result of bargaining over quantities within the context of
a cooperative game, that is, a game in which direct communication is
possible and players can make "binding" contracts among themselves. Edgeworth originally analyzed a two-person, two-good bargaining game, each player endowed with certain quantities of each
good and having preference orderings over them. 21 He demonstrated
that there usually exists a set of possible trades that share the attributes
(a) that each player is not made worse off than in the absence of trade
and (b) that there are no trades more beneficial to both. This core of an
exchange economy has been more formally defined as redistributions
of the total endowment that no group of agents (or single agent in a
two-person game) can improve upon. 22 Edgeworth also showed that if
one increases the numbers of the two types of players (with identical
endowments and preferences within each type), the core of this exchange economy would shrink to the Walrasian equilibrium (or equilibria, if nonunique). 23 That is, in the unique equilibrium case, the exchanges that take place in the Edgeworth scheme will be identical to
those induced by the Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
About the existence both of language and of a normative legal or
customary structure in the Edgeworthian story there can be no doubt,
because it models a competitive exchange economy as a cooperative
game. 24 The two most important features which definitionally distinguish "cooperative" from "noncooperative" games are (1) the possibility of interagent communication and (2) the assumption that binding
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(i.e., enforceable) contracts can be made. 25 As soon as one assumes
that one is operating within a "cooperative" game, two of the most
fundamental prerequisites of social organization-shared language and
the enforceability of agreements where there are incentives to violation-have been taken as givens: their origins, perforce, cannot be
elucidated by analysis of the process or outcome of a cooperative game.
Obviously, one also needs a shared language in the Walrasian
story. But the status of legal or customary rules in the Walrasian version is more problematic. Werner Hildebrand terms the Walrasian
equilibrium concept "noncooperative, " 26 distinguishing it from the
"cooperative" core concept, but this does not satisfactorily dispose of
the issue. Walras himself was unclear about the analytical status of
institutions or rules in his model, although there are passages that
unambiguously demonstrate that he assumed four categories of exogenous variables in his system: tastes, technologies, endowments, and
rules. 27 Logically, this seems the only way to make sense of the apparatus of the auctioneer and the implicit assumption of privately
owned endowments. In Foundations of Economic Analysis, Paul
Samuelson recognizes the importance of this fourth category of exogenous variable, 28 but in several other important expositions institutions
get remarkably little emphasis. Bent Hansen, for example, fails to
mention institutions or rules in his Survey of General Equilibrium Systems :29 there is no entry in the index for anything even vaguely related
to these concepts. Government appears only late in the book, when
money is introduced, and then only as the agency that fixes the stock of
this commodity. A reader may emerge from such expositions with a
less than clear understanding of the importance (or at a minimum, the
debate over the importance) of exogenously specified rules, norms, or
institutions in determining (along with tastes, technologies, and endowments) a general equilibrium. A similar neglect is evident in Gerard
Debreu's Theory of Value. 30
One of the often emphasized advantages of the limited rules associated with a Walrasian competitive economy has been its purported
economizing both on rule formation and on transactions costs of exchange. The existence of a universally known price vector avoids the
complicated higgling and haggling of an N-person Edgeworth economy
or the elaborate and specific rules necessary in a command economy
undertaking reallocation ofresources by central directive. Moreover, if
endowments or technologies change (creating disequilibria in the form
of excess demands of supplies), information concerning the needed
direction of quantity adjustment is "automatically" communicated to
all market participants through variation in the price vector, enabling
individuals to coordinate their plans so as to avoid unfilled demands or
unsold output.
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An example can illustrate the posited adjustment mechanisms.
Suppose an economy to consist of only two regions (agents). In the first
instance, each region places demands and offers supplies according to
a pattern which corresponds to self-sufficiency. A new transport technology now becomes available, drastically lowering the cost of transportation between the two regions. Markets will no longer clear at the
previous price levels, and excess supplies will show up at previously
equilibrating input prices and (region-specific) output prices. The auctioneer will grope for a new equilibrium by offering a slightly different
set of prices, with lower region-specific output prices for the affected
commodities. Given different regional endowments, the adjustment to
a new interregional regime of specialization will be automatically coordinated by the change in the equilibrium price vector.
The automaticity of this market adjustment process, however, depends on the auctioneer, on the mutually agreed-on respect for privately owned endowments, and on the fulfillment of promises to supply
certain amounts of such endowments at certain prices. The fact that
the Walrasian market game involves a solution concept that is in strict
game-theoretic terms "noncooperative" does not mean that it is a
game played without rules any more than the fact that chess is a "noncooperative" game means that one can ignore its rules in understanding or predicting its sequence of moves.
In discussions of market interaction, where the basic constitutive
rules of the market are presupposed, it is not usually necessary to make
explicit reference to the concept of rules or norms in explaining why
the game ends as it does: one need only appeal to individuals pursuing
their own self-interests given the structure of the situation as it is
presented to them. But the outcomes "explained" using these models
are just as conditional on the basic rules of the game as they are on
technologies, preferences, endowments, or the behavioral assumption
of utility or profit maximization. There is nothing mystical about the
coordination capabilities of a market: those capabilities inhere in its
rules.
To what degree, however, can the analytical techniques of game
theory be used to explain why certain rule structures prevail rather
than others? That is, do observed rules tend to represent "efficient"
solutions to problems presented by prevailing resource, preference,
and technological environments? A response to this question requires
some subtle distinctions. In the case of a limited number of regulative
rather than constitutive rules, the answer is affirmative. These rules are
regulative in the sense that the posited choice among rules presupposes
shared language as well as a prevailing more fundamental set of rules.
Insofar as the origins of language or of the more fundamental constitutive rules of a group or society are concerned, the answer is negative,
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or at least that is the argument of this paper. 31 Section III begins by
considering the choice of certain kinds of regulative rules, which correspond to solutions of games of coordination. It concludes with a discussion of the limitations of coordination game models with respect to
the explanation of the origin of language. Section IV considers why the
explanatory program that, in principle, works for problems of coordination does not work for the explanation of the choice of more fundamental constitutive rules (even assuming shared language).
III. Games of Coordination and Regulative Rules That Solve Them
Suppose a group has a basic shared language but is trying to reach
agreement on a set of linguistic symbols to correspond to a set of newly
encountered phenomena. The problem of selecting such a set of rules
of communication is formally analogous to a problem popularized by
Thomas Schelling: 32 Suppose two individuals wish to meet in New
York. They do not care where they meet but care greatly that they do
in fact meet. Assuming only three possible meeting places in New
York, each has to choose one of these as his or her destination. The
situation has a payoff matrix corresponding to figure I.
Any combination of a row choice and column choice can be
thought of as a rule organizing the behavior of these two individuals.
These rules are regulative, not constitutive, in the sense that the structure of the problem presupposes the existence of a stable civil society
(i.e., shared language and agreement on fundamental rules). In this
case there are nine possible regulative rules, three of which (the ondiagonal elements of the matrix) are Pareto superior to any of the other
six (the off-diagonal elements), in the sense that these rules are associC
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ated with payoffs that make both parties better off than they would be
under an off-diagonal rule. Once established, any one of these three
"efficient" rules presents no incentive to either party to try to create a
new rule. There is unfortunately no guarantee that the parties will
arrive easily, in the absence of preplay communication, at a rule corresponding to a diagonal element. This is a pure problem of coordination
in a game which involves no real conflict of interest. The problem was
"solved" (by Schelling) by appeal to a process of socialization undergone by both individuals, which suggested to each of them that the
most obvious place to meet (perhaps) was the information booth at
Grand Central Station. 33
Some problems with basically the same formal structure are such
questions as what gauge our railroads should have; what side of the
road one should drive on; what sublanguages, including computer languages, one should use; where the keys on the typewriter should be
located; what system for broadcasting and receiving color television
signals should be employed; what our standards of weights and measures should be (metric or otherwise); how large one should make the
computer card; 34 what international standard there should be for audio
and video cassettes, video discs; and so on. The actual problems of
choice among regulative rules are frequently complicated by the fact
that they emerge over time, that they do not always involve identical
benefits to all parties, and that there is sometimes sunk physical and
human capital associated with one or more of the options. But this
capital in principle can be included in a social calculus by giving it a
definite valuation, at least in terms of current replacement costs, and
therefore differs from the invested "capital" that may appear to be
associated with the resolution of more fundamental problems, as will
become apparent in the next section.
This analysis of rules of coordination seems to offer some support
for the proposition that those rule structures that now prevail do so
because they are efficient. The prevalence of certain rules rather than
others can be explained by reference to their consequences. The rules
associated with the three on-diagonal elements in figure 1 are efficient
in comparison with those associated with the off-diagonal elements.
Suppose in the Schelling problem that the two individuals are not indifferent about which of the three places they meet at: Grand Central
Station was in fact preferred to Lincoln Center or the Empire State
Building, because the two travelers intended to continue together by
train. However, because they had met elsewhere in the past, each
could not be sure the other would go to the train station: they were still
faced with a dilemma. One can examine this new situation by considering a payoff matrix similar to figure 1, but where the R 2 C 2 payoff has
been changed to (3, 3).
This is still a pure game of cooperation-where the term does not
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mean that this is necessarily a cooperative game in which communication between the agents is possible and binding contracts can be made,
but rather that in any given cell, payoffs to the two agents are equal.
(These two uses of similar terms must be carefully distinguished.)
N everthless, as compared with the situation described in figure 1, the
R 2 C2 choice is now clearly the optimal rule. Imagine that one observes
that a rule yielding the R 2 C2 choice prevails. (Note that one could as
well be talking about railway gauges or computer languages as meeting
places.) Then, according to a neoclassical institutional economist, 35
who wants to make rule selection and changes endogenous, the explanation for why one observes this rule is that it had been selected as if a
social maximizer had considered all nine possible rules and had chosen
the Pareto-superior one. Recognizing that it is costly to change established patterns, especially if they are embodied in human and physical
capital (i.e., the cases of metric conversion, railway gauges, etc.), it
does not seem totally unreasonable to hypothesize that in the long run
political processes would arise to solve problems of this sort by creating channels of communication and permitting coordination. Indeed,
one might define the presence or absence of a political process according to whether or not communication is permitted among the agents.
Another way of saying that a political process is likely, in the long run,
to solve pure problems of coordination is that the R 2 C2 rule is the one
that the agents would quickly arrive at if they were able to communicate.
In the absence of communication, however, there is no automatic
mechanism to get one from R 1C 1 or R 3 C 3 to R 2 C2 • Both parties would
obviously prefer to be at the latter point, but may hesitate before
abandoning a traditional solution for fear that they will end up in one of
the off-diagonal (0, 0) situations. But when the benefits of a new standard, meeting place, or railway gauge exceed those of the current
outcome by a margin larger than the cost of conversion, including losses
due to equipment or training made unusable by the conversion, then it
does not seem totally unreasonable to search for (or indeed create, if
one is in a policymaking position) a political process establishing communication and coordination of the move so as to avoid the losses
associated with an off-diagonal situation. Solutions to such problems
require a somewhat more interventionist auctioneer than Walras
described, one who must not only announce price vectors and total
orders but also promulgate additional regulative rules, but it is not
unreasonable to assume that a political process could solve such problems easily and predictably (especially if compensation can be paid).
The presence or absence of communication is obviously central to
the solution of coordination problems, which are problems of establishing conventions. Both the Edgeworth "cooperative" and the Walrasian "noncooperative" versions of the competitive economy also pre-
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suppose the ability of agents to communicate-the former in order that
they may negotiate trades, and the latter so that they may understand
the meaning of the price vectors cries au hasard by Walras's auctioneer. Language is perhaps the most pervasive example of a set of
rules organizing interaction (in this case communication) between individuals. To what extent can language itself be viewed as the outcome
of a game of coordination in which conventions are established? Consideration of the problem of infinite regress warrants pessimism about
such inquiries.
The most serious difficulty with this approach is the lack of explanation for the language that negotiators could use in establishing these
conventions. In an amusing but important foreword to David Lewis's
book on Convention, W. V. 0. Quine recollects how he originally
conceived of it: "When I was a child I pictured our language as settled
and passed down by a board of syndics, seated in grave convention
along a table in the style of Rembrandt. The picture remained for a
while undisturbed by the question what language the syndics might
have used in their deliberations, or by dread of vicious regress. " 36
Quine alludes here to his eventual rejection of the proposition that
the rules of language could be understood as if they originated in conventions: as Lewis puts it, Quine concluded that "our use of language
conforms to regularities-but no more.' ' 37
Although one can posit, following Noam Chomsky, that all human
beings are born with the genetic capability for mastering the syntax of a
language, the rules of any specific language are transmitted culturally
from generation to generation as part of the process of socialization:
individuals do not rely on a process of negotiation or market interaction to ensure that each new generation in a particular region grows up
speaking a similar language. Moreover, historical evidence suggests
that linguistic traditions demonstrate remarkable powers of persistence. The explanations for why people in certain wards of Manchester,
New Hampshire, or towns in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, speak French
at home rather than English reflect accidents of history and culture
rather than rational responses to different resource endowments or
technological problems from those faced by their English-speaking
neighbors. Although some languages are slightly more flexible in dealing with certain types of communication than others, in general any
number of languages can satisfactorily provide a medium of communication, provided all members of the relevant group know them.
Whereas it is true that among sets of possible regulative rules designed
to solve problems of coordination, efficient ones tend to persist, it is
not true that the specific character of a language itself can be explained
in the same fashion. A shared basic language is a prerequisite, not an
outcome, of the establishment of such conventions.
The rules dealt with in the first part of this section were regulative.
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The structure of these problems presupposed the existence of shared
language and an otherwise stable, functioning social order. But if the
choice among these rule sets can in principle be explained using these
techniques, is it not possible that the research program can be extended to explain choice among more fundamental rules and, in the
limit, all rule and institutional structures? Doubts have already been
raised about the possibility of explaining the origin of language along
such lines. Suppose, however, shared language is taken as given. If it
were true that political processes arose and operated solely to deal with
problems of coordination, then the research program suggested by a
neoclassical approach to institutional economics might be quite promising. But to assume that this is true is to assume away most of the
important problems of political, economic, and social organization.
Coordination problems correspond to games of pure cooperation, 38 and
only a limited subset of social rules are designed to solve problems of
coordination. As soon as one considers the origin and persistence of
rules that provide guarantees against the use of force and fraud, thus
providing an environment in which individuals are capable of (and
willing voluntarily to enter into) binding contracts, one faces situations
where "socially desirable" outcomes are not stable (i.e., there are
strong individual incentives to rule violation and thereby rule breakdown). In these cases the explanatory program associated with neoclassical institutional economics runs into obstacles that are probably
insurmountable.
IV. Prisoner's Dilemma Rules versus Coordination Rules

The so-called Prisoner's Dilemma has received so much attention that
it has almost become a cliche. Cliche or not, the dilemma has not in
any way been attenuated by game theorists' familiarity with it. The
standard example involves two prisoners 39 (perhaps freedom fighters in
a just war) who are faced with the following choices by their captors: if
they both confess, they are each sentenced to 5 years in jail; if they
both refuse to confess, they are sentenced to 1 year; but if one turns
state's evidence and the other does not, the squealer goes free and the
other is executed. This creates a payoff matrix in the two-person case
which can be represented by figure 2.
What is immediately apparent is that the outcome best for both
individuals considered together (the upper left) is not the best for each
prisoner considered individually. Moreover, as each prisoner considers the options, he realizes that regardless of what the other decides to
do, he will be individually better off choosing the squealer strategy.
Unless imbued with very strong norms of solidarity, then, the two
prisoners end up in the R 2 C2 situation, in spite of the fact that ex post
each prisoner would have been better off individually in two of the
remaining outcomes. The problem here is that the presence or absence
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of preplay communication makes absolutely no difference in the structure of the problem: the temptation to cheat on an agreement apparently makes the game with communication degenerate into exactly the
same game that exists without it.
The Prisoner's Dilemma, although it can describe a situation
within an established social context, is relevant more generally as a
metaphor for the fundamental problem of civil society: How does one
escape from the Hobbesian state of nature? Since the fundamental
rules which prevent such a war of all against all from developing are
among those termed the constitutive rules of society in this paper, it is
important to ask whether the emergence of or choice among such rules
can be understood as resulting from the actions of freely choosing selfinterested individuals unconstrained by such rules. Option 1 can be
interpreted as disarming oneself in the expectation that one's opponents will do likewise, trusting others or, in general, letting down one's
guard.
There are several ways to "solve" the Prisoner's Dilemma analytically, depending on which outcome one wishes to rationalize. One
"solution" is to recognize that self-interest drives each player to a
betrayal-because betrayal is the dominant strategy for each player in
the single-play case (R 2 C2 is a minimax Nash equilibrium) 40 -throw up
one's hands, and conclude on theoretical a priori grounds that a nonbetrayal outcome is impossible. But this is a troubling solution, since
one in fact frequently does observe mutual nonbetrayal (R1C1 behavior). Another solution is to impose externally a norm of solidarity that
permits the agents to reach the upper-left-hand outcome. A solution
with equivalent consequences would be to assume that the players are
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pure altruists, each concerned only with maximizing the welfare of the
other. Observing that if one keeps quiet, the other player will be better
off no matter which course he chooses, both players keep quiet and
end up with the upper-left-hand outcome. This "explains" nonbetrayal
but violates the principles of methodological individualism as defined
here; thus it is shunned by many game theorists.
Another strategy commonly pursued by game theorists is to assume that the game is repeated, creating what is called a supergame.
One effort in this direction, cast within the framework of some of
the political problems discussed in the essay, is found in Michael Taylor's Anarchy and Cooperation. 41 Taylor assumes, as does this paper,
that the Prisoner's Dilemma is a useful metaphor for the Hobbesian
state of war. He then assumes that an individual in the state of nature is
in a supergame: Taylor assumes not only that the state of nature can be
conceived of as a repeated game, but that it can be viewed as a game
repeated infinitely. If it were repeated a finite number of times, a dominant strategy would obviously be to betray on the last play. Since one
could predict the outcome on the last play, the same logic would apply
to the penultimate play, and so on, until one reached the conclusion
that betrayal was the dominant strategy for all plays. In other words,
turning the Prisoner's Dilemma problem into a finitely repeated game
does not change the nature of the dilemma: the dilemma in each iteration of a series is exactly what it would be in an isolated single play
game. Luce and Raiffa recognized this logic but still felt it would be
"reasonable" in the finite-play case to choose strategy 1 in an attempt
to "teach" one's opponent not to defect, responding to defections with
"punishments" in the form of one's own defections. This gets to the
heart of what is meant by ''reasonable,'' but their argument as it stands
is tortuous and ultimately unconvincing, and most subsequent writers,
including Taylor, do not accept it. 42
By assuming an infinitely repeated game and, at least in chap. 3,
exponential discounting of payoffs, Taylor is able to show that there
exist other pairs of equilibrium strategies (in the sense that once established, neither player has an incentive to deviate) besides the strategy
pair where each player betrays continually. 43 Taylor is not primarily
concerned with the problem of methodological individualism, but
rather with the justification or lack thereof for a coercive state. 44 He
does not limit himself to the case where individuals are assumed to be,
as he puts it, purely egoistic. The central part of his analysis (chap. 3),
however, is conducted under this assumption, including the demonstration that under the aforementioned conditions individuals acting
purely egoistically could attain outcomes other than continuous betrayal.
Can this explanation account for nonbetrayal outcomes and at the
same time preserve the principles of methodological individualism? By
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assuming that a state of nature can be represented by an infinitely
repeated game, Taylor has already assumed an overall structure of
rudimentary nonbetrayal interaction. There is no a priori reason for
assuming that a Prisoner's Dilemma game in a state of nature is repeated, let alone infinitely repeated. If one lays down one's guns in
pursuit of a nonbetrayal outcome and is annihilated by one's devious
opponent, there is no replay. Taylor must implicitly presume some sort
of legal or customary structure that prevents his players from exiting
prematurely from the series of plays. This seems to be the fundamental
difficulty with efforts (by no means limited to Taylor's work) to derive
nonbetrayal outcomes as the result of a series of "noncooperative"
games and thereby to claim to have explained cooperation without the
aid of the ad hoc assumptions associated with a "cooperative" game.
The specific game-theoretic meaning of "noncooperative" must always be kept in mind when using this term. "Noncooperative" games
are not played without rules.
The Prisoner's Dilemma payoff matrix characterizes a great many
situations in which a group (or two people) are jointly better off under a
rule organizing their behavior that nevertheless leaves great temptations for rule violations. On some campuses in the United States a
bicycle can be left unguarded and unlocked and still be retrieved: on
others this is a certain prelude to a visit with one's insurance agent. If
members of a group agree not to steal each others' bicycles, they all
save the real resources that would othewise be used to purchase locks
and chains. But there is a clear incentive (especially ifno police force is
provided) for each and every individual publicly to support the agreement and privately to appropriate bikes when they need them. If more
than a few yield to this temptation, the agreement breaks down, and
the upper-left-hand solution (no chains, no thefts) degenerates into the
lower-right-hand solution (chains, no thefts).
Much of our legal system has evolved in order to deal with problems of this sort, and although enforcement expenditures generally
accompany rules where there are incentives to violation, the maintenance of the nonstealing outcome relies to a great extent on the willingness of a sufficiently large fraction of the population to forgo the temptations of immediate gain. An individual may be willing to do this if he
has confidence that a sufficiently large fraction of the rest of the population will act in the same fashion. Similarly, the Internal Revenue
Service relies on intimidation and fines to ensure that taxes will be
paid, but as their literature points out again and again, the fundamental
basis of the system is voluntary compliance. One final example is from
the realm of foreign affairs. In 1929, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson unilaterally closed the joint State Department-War Department
Cipher Bureau, explaining that "gentlemen do not read each other's
mail," and believing that mutual trust was the best route to world
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peace. 45 Was Stimson a courageous diplomat or a naive fool? Can a
response to this question be made simply on the basis of the analytical
structure of the situation?
In a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, even assuming ability to communicate, there can be no presumption that negotiation or a "political
process" will get the parties to a nonbetrayal solution. First of all, the
socially desirable situation (socially desirable in the bicycle case, if not
the Prisoner case) is not Pareto superior. As compared with either of
the off-diagonal elements, it makes one party much better off at the
expense of another who is made a little worse off. There is absolutely
no theoretical presumption based on the behavioral assumption of
strict pursuit of self-interest that the political process will succeed in
establishing and maintaining an R 1C 1 rule: the social stability resulting
from widespread acceptance of norms against theft or physically harming others is always precarious, always subject to disturbance, always
subject to the risk that a large number of people in the relevant population will decide to go for short-run gains. Clearly, when all do so and
the stability breaks down, they are all worse off. But how does one
respond to what one might call the Yossarian argument? In Catch 22,
an associate begrudges the protagonist his unwillingness to fly combat
missions by asking what would happen if everyone felt that way. Yossarian replies that in that case he would "certainly be a damn fool to
feel any other way. " 46
The logical and moral problems created by situations of this type
would be more amusing were they not so serious. For example, it is
commonly argued that one ought to pay taxes because if no one paid,
all would suffer. This type of argument by generalization (one should
not do a, because if all did a, it would be disastrous) is however not
always valid, as can be seen by substituting "not be an economist" for
"pay taxes." The argument that one should not be an economist,
because if everyone were an economist we would have nothing to eat,
is not a valid argument against joining the profession (although there
may be others). Furthermore, the argument in favor of paying taxes is
subject to devastating rebuttals, especially if they are used in tandem.
First, one can argue that since everyone is going to pay, no one will be
the wiser if one cheats. If this argument does not work, one can come
back with, "Since no one would be fool enough to pay their taxes,
disaster will arrive anyway, and you don't expect me to be a sucker, do
you?" 47 Philosophers have wrestled with these normative problems
with varying degrees of success, without being able to resolve them.
This lack of resolution, in a sense, mirrors the positive indeterminacy
of Prisoner's Dilemma outcomes.
Historically, some level of enforcement expenditure (if only to
convince those willing to abide by the rule if others do that they will not
be suckers) has usually been required to ensure tolerable levels of
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compliance. The problem for the research program set forth by neoclassical institutional economists is that the enforcement costs associated with maintaining a tolerable level of compliance may not be independent of the length of time a rule has been in place, although the
functional form relating enforcement costs to rule longevity is not obvious on a priori grounds. In the limit, enforcement costs may drop to
zero, and the weight of tradition, through a process understood only
imperfectly, may make it simply unthinkable for any agent to violate
the current practice, in spite of individual incentives to do so.
Suppose one is willing to assume, without explanation, the existence of shared language and of a political process capable of scanning
actual and potential organizational blueprints in search of the most
"efficient" one. Such a scan could be done on the basis of Benthamite
utilitarian principles, with interpersonal comparisons of utility; or it
could be done by a Pareto optimizer who respects utility levels associated with some initial resource distributions, or by a Kaldor-Hicks
compensator, whether or not he actually pays compensation. Such a
political scanner ought in principle to be able to solve regulative problems involving games of coordination. Regardless of which of these (or
other) algorithms is used, however, such a program will confront a
very serious difficulty when applied to the selection of more fundamental rules. Such rules govern Prisoner's Dilemma-like situations and
frequently require expenditures on enforcement to ensure that R 1C 1
behavior does not degenerate into the more stable R 2 C2 outcomes. To
the extent that the political scanner does not know these costs, his
attempt to select efficient rules will break down, because the true individual payouts associated with various rules under consideration are
net of enforcement costs; and without known enforcement costs, one
does not know the true payout vector. Deductive logic does not point
the way toward knowledge of these costs: a priori theorizing provides
no obvious method for assigning probabilities to various levels of enforcement costs. One might be able to assign such probabilities using
historical data, but such procedures are inductive and would raise
difficulties for those who wish to obtain results using strictly a priori
theorizing. What deductive foundation would there be for the persistence of these probabilities?
The cultural or historical conditions that may make it possible to
sustain R 1C 1 behavior with relatively low real expenditures on enforcement can be thought of as invested "capital" associated with the existing institutional arrangements. But this "capital" differs from the capital associated, for example, with a narrow-gauge railway in one part of
the country, which may have to be torn up and replaced if a different
gauge is adopted nationwide. The difference is that one can, given
technical or engineering data on the costs of extracting and transforming raw materials, calculate the approximate replacement cost of the
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junked tracks and compare this with what would have to be junked if
another gauge were at some time adopted universally. There is no
obvious way either analytically or with engineering data to calculate
the "replacement" cost of the "capital" associated with the more
fundamental rule structures now under consideration. The technology
of reconstructing credibility, expectations about future behavior, or
more generally, political legitimacy, depends not on predictable physical relationships but on the much less predictable human propensities
to forget, to trust, to cooperate. A state of mutual trust is not therefore
a commodity, like a locomotive, that can easily be given a market
valuation approximating its cost of construction or replacement.
For example, imagine that as the result of institutional innovation
or a change in the resource or technological environment, a new organizational option became available-an option which, if it could be
established as a new rule structure with no increase over current levels
of enforcement costs, would be Pareto superior (preferred or tolerated
by all parties) to current practice. Is there any presumption that the
political process will operate so as to get one to this new position?
Conservatives might with good reason suspect that, in reality, a rise in
enforcement costs over current levels would be necessary to maintain
this newly introduced regime in the context of the disruptions of the
changeover, more than wiping out any apparent advantage. Radicals
might argue that one could rapidly establish a new "stable order" and
move to the level where the original (or even lower) levels of enforcement expenditures were necessary. There is no a priori means of deciding between the conservative and radical arguments; and there is therefore no presumption that the political process would necessarily
operate so as to select the most "efficient" rule where elements of
conflict exist potentially, because the true payouts associated with the
rule depend on knowledge of its enforcement or overhead costs. Such
costs may be influenced by longevity of rules; then again they may not:
the functional form relating costs to longevity cannot be determined
using deductive logic alone.
When considering fundamental constitutive rules, the posited
political institution scanner could not be assumed to select "efficient
rules," because the true payout vector in these cases could not be
known with certainty. This is not necessarily a matter of different
attitudes toward risk. Differences between conservatives and radicals,
to the extent that they frame their arguments in terms of the good of the
collectivity-generally a prerequisite for political discourse-may
reflect substantial differences in the perception of uncertain net payoff
matrices even in cases where there are no differences in risk preferences. In order to make such a scan theoretically feasible, one would
have to assume invariance of "rule abidance willingness" with respect
to potential changes in rules. Having made this final assumption, along
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with the assumptions of shared language and a basic political
framework, one would find that what began as an attempt to defend the
more ambitious second position outlined at the start of this essay, had
arrived, through a slow process of attrition, at the first position.
Game theorists sometimes become so enamored of the mechanics
of the theory and the single-minded determination of their players to
win that they lose sight of what any game-theoretic problem presupposes: the arena in which the players are to compete or cooperate. To
give a striking example: von Neumann and Morgenstern demonstrated
that it is theoretically possible to develop for the game of chess, as for
checkers and other games of perfect information, a theory that would
predict what actions a rational opponent interested in winning would
undertake given the layout of the board and the next move one
makes. 48 But one will not obtain, nor does one expect to obtain from
such a theory, an explanation for why knights move in an L-shaped
pattern or bishops move diagonally. Similarly, although one can investigate with game theory the dilemmas possibly faced by two prisoners,
one should not expect from such a theory an explanation for why
escape or insurrection is not part of the strategy space. As has been
argued, the arena of any interactive game is partly determined by resources and technologies, but the social norms that pervade the atmosphere are an equally important characteristic of that arena. A Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players are imbued with a strong norm of
solidarity may have a different outcome from one where this is lacking
The same may be said for a game where the guards share the political
objectives of the captives. Even war, on the face of it a complete
breakdown of international norms or rules, is in fact conducted according to highly elaborated rules and conventions. Few responsible military personnel maintain that all is fair in war: 49 constraints on acceptable military action are an integral part of most military training.
V. Conclusions
The question whether such concepts as norms can in principle be completely dispensed with (by reducing them to some logically prior round
of individual interaction in which appeal to norms or normlike concepts
is not made) is an important one, too important indeed for economists
to remain agnostic about. Some practitioners of microeconomic analysis answer this question unhesitatingly in the affirmative. Many others
remain somewhat skeptical, although basically sympathetic: the
thought that with further development the techniques of gametheoretical analysis will lead us in this direction is a comforting one.
Economists have frequently been hostile to structuralist explanations, and this essay is not intended as support for an extreme structuralist view of the world, in which agents lack free will and dangle like
marionettes on strings connected to structures deeply embedded in
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history, culture, or genetics. But the legitimacy of the concept itself
cannot be gainsaid (although one may, if one desires, view these structures as continually and voluntarily reaffirmed, generation after generation). Their effect at the individual level is to define the range and
nature of options treated by the individual as legitimate in considering
ways to improve his individual welfare and, residually, those which are
not. Those options excluded in principle (murder, theft, kidnapping,
blackmail, etc.) clearly constrain individual action. The range of excluded options and thus the severity of these constraints may vary
across time and space, but so long as civil society persists, this constraining influence never disappears entirely; and so long as social
stability is desired, one will not wish that it do so. In any society not all
individuals respect all these exclusions, but a sufficiently large number
do to make stable social interactions possible.
If one maintains that norms or rules logically antedate markets
(and indeed situations of strategic interaction), then one must pay close
attention to the historical, legal, or cultural evolution of the situation
under study. Recognizing that norms need to be analyzed in their own
right, using extraeconomic and often case-specific methods, one can
redefine microeconomic analysis as the analysis of the results of behavior by self-interested agents acting within constraints determined in
part by technologies, resources, and the preference of others, but also
in part by the systems of rules or norms confronted (in the sense that
they constrain the behavior of others) or participated in (in the sense
that they influence individual behavior irrespective of others' behavior). Any outcomes predicted or explained by such behavioral models
are as conditional on the specified "social restraints" (norms) as they
are on the other more commonly specified categories of exogenous
variables.
Given shared language and other fundamental rules, the techniques of game theory do provide a framework for understanding how,
in the case of a limited set of regulative rules, a political process might
select from a group of possible rules or norms those which are most
efficient. This technique does not, unfortunately, work for the explanation of the origin of those fundamental rules (or the origin of language).
If one defines rational behavior as the selection of appropriate means
for the achievement of desired ends, and defines these ends strictly in
terms of the interests of the individual who is selecting these ends, one
reaches the conclusion that all organized social activity presupposes
behavior on the part of individuals that could easily be stigmatized as
nonrational, if not irrational, according to this definition. Why, after
all, should the individual, so careful about calculating individual gains
as affected by variations in what he sees as legitimate options, be so
willing to accept a certain range of other options as illegitimate when he
has no real guarantee that others will continue to do so? How came he

Alexander James Field

705

to accept these in the first place? This paper has argued that it is
impossible to understand such behavior as resulting from rational
means-individual end calculations without first assuming a set of logically anterior rules, norms, or excluded options.
Utilitarianism and the methodological individualism frequently associated with it have historically performed yeoman service in calling
into question various established institutions and procedures. But its
weakness had been the problem of order. This paper has argued that in
order to maintain analytically an arena of human choice in which
means-end type calculations can legitimately be assumed to prevail,
one must assume a complementary range of options that are ruled out
of consideration by individuals, in spite of the fact that means-end
calculations would suggest to them opportunities for individual gain
from doing otherwise. For any historical situation, the delineation of
that arena is a tricky but essential business, and it cannot be done on
the basis of first principles. The recognition of boundaries beyond
which means-end calculations cannot reasonably (and should not) be
assumed to prevail is the intellectual price that must be paid for preserving an arena in which they can.
The inscription "Obedience to Law is Liberty" is emblazoned
over the Main Street courthouse in Worcester, Massachusetts. This
fundamentally conservative sentiment, expressed though it is in terms
some would find overbearing, nevertheless embodies a truth about
the persistence of all stable social orders: norms established through
the process of socialization, perhaps "voluntarily" accepted or
affirmed, perhaps building on certain genetic predispositions, provide
part of the framework within which individuals pursue their selfinterests. Intellectually defensible microeconomic analysis, in its competitive or game-theoretic variant, can be undertaken only if this principle is recognized; the refusal to recognize it leaves one with no
satisfactory explanation for why the world does not degenerate into a
war of all against all. As a positive statement about the operation of the
real world and the tasks of social science, this proposition is
straightforward enough. This having been said, it remains true that
there are many solutions to problems of order, and this paper has only
touched upon the normative problems associated with evaluating, according to a standard yet to be agreed upon, various possible rules and
acts. 50
Notes

* The development of this paper benefited from funds provided by the
Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance, Stanford University, and research opportunities afforded during a year (1979-80) spent at
the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey. Earlier versions
were presented at the Social Science seminar at the Institute in October 1979;
at the Conference on Irrationality: Explanation and Understanding held at the

706

Economic Development and Cultural Change

Maison des Sciences de !'Homme in Paris, France, January 7-9, 1980; and at
the University of Washington, Seattle, December 1982. I am grateful to participants in these sessions and to two anonymous referees for their comments and
reactions.
1. The term "norm" is used here in a restricted sense to refer to legal,
cultural, or conventional rules regulating interaction between individuals. Sociologists and anthropologists sometimes use a broader definition, e.g., when
they speak of consumption norms. Such behavior-influencing variables influence interactions between persons and things and, following standard economic usage, can more appropriately be termed preferences. Admittedly the
distinction is not hard and fast and may be difficult to operationalize, since
exhibition of certain consumption behavior may represent willingness to
abide by the rules of a group or subgroup. See also n. 27.
2. For a detailed discussion of the promise and achievement of work along
these lines by Richard Posner, Douglass North, and Robert Paul Thomas, see
Alexander J. Field, "The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics:
A Critique with Special Reference to the North-Thomas Model of Pre-1500
Europe," Explorations in Economic History 18 (April 1981): 174-98.
3. "Extreme" in the sense that all rules, including the most fundamental,
are to be explained in this fashion. Section III of this paper argues that the
emergence and persistence of a limited number of regulative rules can be
explained as if they had been selected as the result of some sort of maximizing
process, assuming the existence of shared language and a stable political and
social order within which these choices are made.
4. For an example, consider any number of articles in the optimal tax
literature, where individuals may vary their supply of inputs in response to tax
changes, but compliance rates are assumed invariant to policy changes.
5. The term "methodological individualism" is used here to refer to models (a) where individuals are concerned with their own individual interest and
(b) where the analysis does not introduce concepts that are not or cannot be
reduced to the results of the interaction of strictly self-interested individuals. In
order to avoid any confusion, models in which utility of others enters own
utility functions are excluded as not being consistent with what people generally mean when they speak of methodologically individualist models (see
Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis [New York: Oxford University Press, 1954], p. 888).
6. It is always difficult, without Gallup Polls, to support statements about
disciplinary opinion. It is encouraging to find that Martin Hollis and E. J. Nell
share this perception: "[Western economists] swear . . . even if they would
not always admit to it, a methodological individualism in the attempt to explain
human behavior" (Martin Hollis and E. J. Nell, Rational Economic Man: A
Philosophical Critique of Neoclassical Economics [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975], p. 1). Examples, in addition to those discussed in the
text, include the writings of Gordon Tullock. In The Social Dilemma: The
Economics of War and Revolution (Blacksburg, Va.: University Publications,
1974), pp. 46, 140, Tullock argues that revolutionaries are motivated solely by a
desire for a good job in the new regime. See also Ludwig von Mises, Human
Action (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 42-43, or 14344. Adam Smith wrote, "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner but from their regard to their
own interest," but this must be understood in the context of his earlier work,
esp. The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations
[1759; New York: Modern Library, 1937], p. 14).
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7. Talcott Parsons's The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGrawHill Book Co., 1937) is still a useful source for this critical argument. See also
Emile Durkheim, Moral Education (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961).
8. Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 11-13.
9. Ibid., p. 13.
10. David Rockefeller, "Ethics and the Corporation," Hofstra Law Review 8 (Fall 1979): 135-39.
11. In an interesting article that embodies some of this spirit, Karl Brunner and William Meckling ("The Perception of Man and the Conception of
Government," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 9 [February 1977]: 7085) contrast the "resourceful, evaluating, economic man model" (REMM)
with sociological, political, and psychological models of man. Their article
displays a sympathetic attitude toward political corruption and white collar
crime, accusing liberals of a double standard, whereby corporate crime is
condemned while street crime is excused as being a product of the environment
of poverty. Apparently unimpressed with the argument that the more
privileged members of society have a responsibility to set ethical standards by
their example, they express amazement that in Sweden some legal procedures
affecting those accused of tax evasion are more severe than those for persons
accused of street crime (p. 83). One senses in this article a longing for a return
to a regime in which there would be de jure one law for the rich and one law for
the poor. In such a regime rich people could plead "benefit of wealth" when
accused of capital or other crimes, as members of religious orders were, in
previous centuries, able to plead benefit of clergy, as evidenced by their literacy. Following this line of argument, incarceration for the wealthy could be
argued to represent an inefficient allocation of resources, since the costs of
incarceration plus the forgone output of any person with such high marginal
productivity would more than counterbalance a deterrent effect, whose value
might be questionable in the first place.
12. A good discussion of this tendency can be found in Warren S. Gramm,
"Industrial Capitalism and the Breakdown of the Liberal Rule of Law," J ournal of Economic Issues 7 (December 1973): 577-603. See also Kenneth Boulding, "Ethics and Business: An Economists View," in Beyond Economics (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968).
13. Charles Fried ("Moral Causation," Harvard Law Review 77 [May
1964]: 1258-70) contrasts moral causation with "physical or purely psychological" causation. When the explanation for an act is that the individual concerned thought the action was right, one has an example of moral causation.
Becker's position is apparently that the set of acts explicable as results of
moral causes is empty; all actions are attributable to what Fried calls "physical
or purely psychological causes." See also Charles Fried, "The Cunning of
Reason in Moral and Legal Theory," Journal of Legal Studies 9 (March 1980):
335-53.
14. Becker, p. 5.
15. Sociobiological arguments are one means of providing such an explanation. Becker is sympathetic to such work, which explains, e.g., altruism
toward kin as a trait favored by natural selection: although altruism may reduce
the genetic fitness of the actor, it may increase the probability that genes of the
altruist shared by kin whose genetic fitness is being increased will persist in the
gene pool. Becker points out correctly that such models do not explain altruism
directed toward nonrelatives. Denying Edward 0. Wilson's statement that
altruism by definition reduces genetic fitness, Becker claims that through its
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effect on the behavior of others, altruism may serve to increase the fitness of
the actor himself. Becker does not explain how altruism in the two-person
single play Prisoner's Dilemma increases the genetic fitness of those who practice it (Gary Becker, "Altruism, Egoism and Genetic Fitness: Economics and
Sociobiology," Journal of Economic Literature 14 [September 1976] reprinted
in Becker, pp. 282-94). See also Edward 0. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978).
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